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INTRODUCTION 
Libel tourism is the term given to the practice of obstructing the 
First Amendment by suing American authors and publishers for 
defamation in foreign courts where a lower legal standard allows for 
easier recovery.
1
 Libel plaintiffs typically seek out countries whose laws 
disfavor speech critical of public figures, and the countries often have a 
tenuous connection to the purportedly defamatory statements that 
prompted the suit.
2
 This new trend ultimately undermines the 
Constitution’s First Amendment principles of free speech and free press 
by providing a “legal loophole.”
3
 Moreover, due to the rise of 
technological advances and Internet accessibility worldwide, a 
published document has the potential to appear in any jurisdiction in the 
world. As a result, a libel plaintiff may have the option of initiating 
litigation in any jurisdiction they may choose, even though the 
publication occurred in the United States.
4
 In addition, under the 
doctrines of reciprocity and comity, the United States courts can enforce 
these foreign judgments so long as a court that recognizes and enforces 
United States judgments rendered the decision. All these circumstances 
taken together effectively allow the foreign libel plaintiff to bypass the 
protections afforded by the First Amendment.
5
 
The differences in U.S. and U.K. libel law were once a topic 
reserved for academic journals and law school classrooms. However, a 
case in 1996 caused the two countries’ divide over libel law 
jurisprudence to be brought to the forefront.
6
 Controversial English 
 
1 See Libel Tourism: Hearing on H.R. 6146 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial 
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9-10, 1 (2009) [hereinafter 
Hearing]; Historical Libel Tourism Bill Becomes Law, BAKER HOSTETLER (Aug. 10, 2010), 
available at http://www.bakerlaw.com/news/historic-libel-tourism-bill-becomes-law-08-10-
2010/.  
2 Hearing, supra note 1, at 1.  
3 The “legal loophole” refers to the practice of libel plaintiffs who strategically 
seek out foreign countries that have a lower legal standard than provided by the United 
States First Amendment even though a United States court would be a more appropriate 
forum. Tara Sturtevant, Comment, Can the United States Talk the Talk & Walk the Walk 
When it Comes to Libel Tourism: How the Freedom to Sue Abroad can Kill the Freedom of 
Speech at Home, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 269, 269 (2010). 
4 Publication is defined as “the communication of the allegedly defamatory 
material to a third person.”  It can be accomplished through many means, for example, it can 
be “written, oral, broadcast, printed, photographic, etc.” MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., 
MASS MEDIA LAW 234 (8th ed. 2011). 
5 See discussion of reciprocity and comity infra Part IV. 
6 Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, 
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historian David Irving sued Deborah Lipstadt, a professor from Emory 
University, in London for defamation after she correctly called him a 
“Holocaust denier.”
7
 The Irving-Lipstadt case was international news, 
and dramatically brought the significant divide between U.S. and U.K. 
defamation law into focus.
8
 Ms. Lipstadt assumed the litigation would 
be a “‘classic nuisance suit’” but after five years, a ten day trial, and 
costs of more than $3 million she escaped liability.
9
 
Soon after the Irving-Lipstadt case, a case arose that “opened a 
new phase in the transatlantic free speech rift”: a lawsuit brought in 
England by a non-U.K. resident to capitalize on the country’s plaintiff-
friendly libel laws.
10
 In 1997, Boris Berezovsky, a Russian tycoon, filed 
suit in London against Forbes magazine over an article titled 
“Godfather of the Kremlin?” written by Russian-American journalist 
Paul Kiebnikov.
11
 Forbes argued that it made little sense to litigate a 
case in England, involving a Russian plaintiff and a New York 
magazine, when only a fraction of the article’s readers were located 
there.
12
 Nevertheless, the British courts refused to “loosen their grips”
13
 
on the suit and Forbes eventually withdrew their claims and settled the 
case rather than face trial.
14
 
Following the rise in Internet publishing that weakened traditional 
notions of jurisdictional lines across the globe, politicians and 
billionaires “soon flocked – virtually, at least – to England to settle their 
scores where they knew the deck was stacked in their favor.”
15
 The 
 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Id.; Sarah Lyall, Where Suing for Libel is a National Specialty; Britain’s 
Plaintiff-Friendly Laws Have Become a Magnet for Litigators, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/22/arts/where-suing-for-libel-national-specialty-britain-s-
plaintiff-friendly-laws-have.html. 
10 Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
11 Editor’s Note, Berezovsky versus Forbes, FORBES.COM, Mar. 6, 2003, 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1996/1230/5815090a_print.html. 
12 See Berezovsky v. Michaels and Others, (House of Lords), [2000] 1, W.L.R. 
1004, 1008-09 (Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ 
ldjudgmt/jd000511/bere-1.htm.  
13 Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP).  
14 Editor’s Note, Berezovsky versus Forbes, FORBES.COM, Mar. 6, 2003, 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1996/1230/5815090a_print.html.  
15 Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, 
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leading case to highlight the phenomenon of libel tourism, which 
subsequently prompted state and federal legislation,
16
 was Ehrenfeld v. 
Mahfouz.
17
 In 2004, Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz, libel tourism’s most 
notorious “frequent flier,”
18
 filed a defamation lawsuit against Dr. 
Rachel Ehrenfeld in an English court in response to being named a 
potential terrorism financier in Dr. Ehrenfeld’s book Funding Evil: How 
Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It.
19
 Mahfouz obtained a default 
libel judgment against her enjoining further publication of the 
statements about Mahfouz in England and Wales.
20
 Subsequently, Dr. 
Ehrenfeld sought a declaratory judgment against Mahfouz in the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York in which she argued that 
the foreign judgment was unenforceable and repugnant to her First 
Amendment rights.
21
 The district court dismissed the action for lack of 
personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz.
22
 In a certified question to the Court 
of Appeals of New York, Dr. Ehrenfeld claimed that absent a U.S. court 
ruling regarding her rights, the foreign judgment would have the 
practical effect of chilling her protected speech rights in the United 
States.
23
 On December 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals of New York held 
that Mahfouz’s contacts with the state of New York did not constitute a 
transaction of business in the state and thus New York’s long arm 
statute
24
 did not confer personal jurisdiction over him.
25
 Because a U.S. 
court cannot adjudicate a case without personal jurisdiction over a 
 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP).  
16 See discussion of New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act and the SPEECH 
Act infra Part V. 
17 Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008); Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, 
[2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/ 
EWHC/QB/2005/1156.html.  
18 Hearing, supra note 1, at 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
19 Id.; Ehrenfeld, 518 F.3d at 103-04. 
20 Ehrenfeld, 518 F.3d at 103-04. 
21 Id. at 104. 
22 Id. 
23 Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 2007). 
24 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (a)(1) (McKinney 2008) (“[A]s to a cause of action arising 
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through an 
agent: transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or 
services in the state.”). 
25 Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 831. 
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defendant, the case had to be dismissed.
26
 
While Dr. Ehrenfeld’s case generated a great deal of media 
attention, her case is not exceptional. Throughout the world, journalists 
are increasingly forced to defend themselves against libel suits, 
particularly in the United Kingdom, where the libel laws are stricter 
than those in their own country.
27
 Moreover, foreign courts readily 
affirm jurisdiction over journalists if the material they publish is viewed 
in those countries, thereby eviscerating American journalists’ reliance 
on First Amendment protections.
28
 
The widespread use of the Internet expands this problem. Material 
posted on the Internet can be accessed in any country. As a result, “the 
actions of unrelated third parties – readers of articles online, online 
book purchasers – substantiate jurisdiction in foreign defamation 
disputes.”
29
  Because they are being exposed to suit in practically any 
jurisdiction, American journalists must undertake the daunting task of 
anticipating all the laws they may be subject to by virtue of the fact that 
their material may land in a foreign jurisdiction. In effect, this nearly 
impossible task results in the chilling of free speech for those who do 
not want to face litigation in foreign jurisdictions. 
In order to remedy this problem and effectively preserve First 
Amendment principles, Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of 
our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act (the 
“SPEECH Act”). This Note will examine this federal response and its 
effect on libel tourism. Part I of this Note briefly examines the history 
and principles behind the First Amendment in the United States.  Part II 
articulates the different laws and policies that attract libel tourists to 
England and other countries. In particular, Part II compares the libel 
laws of the United States with popular libel plaintiff-friendly 
jurisdictions, specifically England and Australia. Part II also compares 
certain civil procedure principles within the United States and England. 
Part III discusses the prevalence of libel tourism through relevant case 
law and illustrations. In addition, Part III examines the chilling effects 
of libel tourism on First Amendment principles, and Part IV discusses 
 
26 See discussion of personal jurisdiction infra Part II B 1. 
27 David Kohler, Forty Years After New York Times v. Sullivan: The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 1203, 1204-05 (2004). 
28 See discussion of personal jurisdiction, particularly in the UK infra Part II B 1. 
29 Heather Maly, Note, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum 
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed, 14 J.L. & 
POL’Y 883, 885 (2006). 
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policy considerations and enforcement mechanisms in the United States. 
Part V discusses state and federal responses to libel tourism, in 
particular the New York Libel Terrorism Protection Act and the federal 
SPEECH Act. Finally, Part VI analyzes what impact, if any, the 
SPEECH Act will have on libel tourism. Specifically, Part VI examines 
the policy and procedural perspectives of the legislation, and concludes 
that the SPEECH Act is constitutionally the furthest the United States 
can reach to protect American citizens from foreign defamation 
judgments. 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND DEFAMATION LAW 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
30
 This constitutional 
protection holds a “near sacred place in American society”
31
 and “was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the people.”
32
 Freedom 
of expression is an indispensible means to the discovery of truth and a 
democratic self-government, in which “the greatest menace to freedom 
is an inert people.”
33
 It is secured in our legal system to uphold the 
expression and dissemination of ideas without fear of persecution by the 
government.
34
 
The language of the First Amendment could be misread to suggest 
that the rights protected are absolute; however, this would be a great 
over-generalization. The tort of defamation provides restrictions on 
what can be spoken and printed.
35
 On the other hand, American free 
speech jurisprudence is rooted in the “fourth estate” principle, which 
reflects the notion that the press imposes a critical check on 
governmental powers by keeping the public informed, and that therefore 
 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
31 Maly, supra note 29, at 889.  
32 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).  
33 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
34 Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 272. 
35 50 AM. JUR. 2D LIBEL AND SLANDER § 6 (defamation is a false publication that 
causes injury to a person’s reputation, or exposing him to contempt, public hatred, ridicule, 
shame or disgrace, or which affects him adversely in his trade or business); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977) (“Libel consists of the publication of 
defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by 
any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of 
written or printed words.”). 
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it must receive the utmost protection in its ability to report the news 
without restraint.
36
 In the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment represents “a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may 
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.”
37
 The Court noted that the 
press protections demanded by the Constitution were an intentional 
departure from the British form of government.
38
  In order to give the 
press the “breathing space” essential to reporting on issues of public 
concern, the Court conceded that the “erroneous statement is inevitable 
in free debate” and thus placed strict limitations on libel suits.
39
 The 
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the disputed statement was false, 
and if the plaintiff is a public official, he must prove that the statement 
was made with “actual malice,” which means the defendant had 
knowledge that the statement was false, or displayed a reckless 
disregard for the statement’s truth or falsity.
40
 The Constitution demands 
that the plaintiff must display this high level of fault with “convincing 
clarity.”
41
 Underlying the Court’s decision was the fear that any other 
standard would deter “would-be critics of official conduct . . . from 
voicing their criticism . . . because of doubt whether it can be proved in 
court or fear of the expense of having to do so.”
42
 
The Court continued to provide heightened speech protections by 
expanding the holding of New York Times through subsequent case law. 
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court held that the principles 
articulated in New York Times were also applicable to defamatory 
 
36 Sarah Staveley-O’Carroll, Note, Libel Tourism Laws: Spoiling the Holiday and 
Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 252, 255-56 (2009). 
37 This case concerned an advertisement in the New York Times on behalf of 
several individuals and groups protesting a “wave of terror” against blacks involved in non-
violent demonstrations in the South. Plaintiff, one of three elected commissioners of the 
City of Montgomery, Alabama, was in charge of the police department. He filed a libel 
action against the newspaper and four black ministers whose names appeared in the ad, 
claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. It was 
uncontroverted that there were some inaccuracies in the two allegedly libelous paragraphs. 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-58, 270 (1964).  
38 Id. at 274. 
39 Id. at 271. 
40 Id. at 279-80. 
41 Id. at 285-86. 
42 Id. at 279. 
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statements criticizing “public figures.”
43
 Although the Court declined to 
extend the actual malice standard of New York Times to defamation of 
individual persons who were neither public officials nor public figures, 
the Court nevertheless rejected the English law of strict liability and 
required a private plaintiff to show some degree of fault, with 
negligence being the minimum.
44
 As a result, a plaintiff who is a public 
official or figure has a much greater obstacle to overcome in satisfying 
the constitutional requirements. 
II. WHAT FEATURES ATTRACT LIBEL TOURISTS ABROAD? 
London is often referred to as the “libel capital of the world”
45
 and 
has become the most attractive destination for libel tourists across the 
globe.
46
 While England has a very respectable legal system, there are 
many reasons why libel tourists find England a hospitable sanctuary to 
bring their grievances. First and foremost, England’s libel jurisprudence 
values reputation, while the United States values freedom of expression. 
As will be discussed, this shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the 
truth of an allegedly defamatory statement. In addition, England’s rules 
of civil procedure, most importantly the law of personal jurisdiction, 
makes England a favorite destination for libel tourists. 
A.  Contrasting U.S. and English Libel Law 
Freedom of expression is a fundamental element to democracy, but 
countries differ in how they value this basic right. In the United States, 
freedom of expression is accorded the highest value, and injury to one’s 
reputation, although regrettable, is sometimes an inevitable consequence 
of preserving this freedom.
47
 Conversely, in other countries, particularly 
England, damage to one’s reputation may trump the value of free 
expression. In these instances, some defamation laws permit the courts 
to impose criminal sanctions on the accused. 
 
43 Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); see also Gertz v. Welch, 418 
U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that private figures who report on matters of public concern are 
not necessarily subject to the actual malice standard, but must be subject to some standard of 
fault, negligence being the minimum). 
44 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; Hearing, supra note 1, at 47 (written statement by Laura 
Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
45 Hearing, supra note 1, at 1. 
46 Id. 
47 Maly, supra note 29, at 888-889; see also discussion of First Amendment and 
New York Times v. Sullivan, supra Part I. 
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Of particular importance is the stark contrast between British and 
American jurisprudence. While both countries value freedom of 
expression, they balance the other interests – for instance reputation – 
differently and thus reach conflicting outcomes.
48
 Britain remains highly 
protective of an individual’s reputation and imposes much more rigid 
requirements on media defendants, while the United States understands 
that damage to reputation is an unavoidable consequence.
49
 This 
dichotomy between the United States and Britain lies at the heart of the 
trouble of libel tourism and contributes directly to the uncertainty 
American authors and publishers face when deciding what to publish, 
and in what jurisdiction they may be forced to defend a defamation suit, 
thereby chilling their First Amendment rights. 
1. English Libel Law 
England’s defamation law can be seen as a “mirror image”
50
 of the 
defamation law in the United States,
51
 which explains how England 
became the “libel capital” and has attracted so many libel plaintiffs to 
bring their grievances to England.
52
 England’s defamation law retains 
many of the common law principles overturned in the United States by 
New York Times and its progeny.
53
 Thus, any alleged defamatory 
statement that adversely affects an individual’s reputation is prima facie 
defamatory.
54
 Specifically, the burden of proof shifts from the plaintiff 
to the defendant, where any alleged defamatory statement is presumed 
false and the defense has the burden to prove its truth.
55
 In addition, 
England does not impose any standard of fault, therefore, even if the 
defendant believed the alleged defamatory statement to be true, he can 
still be found liable for defamation.
56
 The only burden placed on the 
plaintiff is to establish that the statement was directed to the plaintiff, 
 
48 Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See discussion of United States libel jurisprudence supra Part I.  
52 Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
53 Todd W. Moore, Untying our Hands: The Case for Uniform Personal 
Jurisdiction over “Libel Tourists,” 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3207, 3212 (2009). 
54 Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
55 Moore, supra note 53, at 3212. 
56 Id.  
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was published by the defendant, and conveyed a defamatory meaning.
57
 
Because the alleged statements are presumed false, the defendant’s 
only recourse is to demonstrate the truth of the statements or establish 
an exception in order to prevail over the charges.
58
 The English courts 
have acknowledged that there are some matters so important to the 
public interest that the defendant does not have to face the high burden 
of proving the truth of the underlying statement at issue.
59
 This is known 
as the “fair comment” exception and may apply to communications 
made by the defendant on matters of public interest; it also must be an 
opinion that the author could reasonably communicate based on facts, 
and made without malice.
60
 Although the fair comment exception can 
relieve a defendant from the burden of proving the truth of the 
underlying statement at issue, it gives far less protection than the laws in 
the United States.
61
 
Another exception to England’s libel law is the absolute privilege 
exception that applies to comments made by members of Parliament.
62
 
Members of the press can also claim this privilege “for fair and accurate 
reporting on judicial proceedings.”
63
 In addition, England’s libel laws 
recognize a qualified privilege when reporting on a government entity, 
reasoning that “government bodies should be open to criticism and 
these institutions should be unable to prohibit speech.”
64
 Nevertheless, 
the application of this privilege is unclear, and is dependent on the 
circumstances of each case.
65
 
2. Australian Libel Law 
While England remains the “libel capital” of the world and the 
main focus of libel tourism commentary, other countries also have 
similar defamation laws that attract libel tourists to these countries. Like 
 
57 Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
58 Maly, supra note 29, at 900. 
59 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/45.html.  
60 Maly, supra note 29, at 901. 
61 Hearing, supra note 1, at 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
62 Maly, supra note 29, at 901. 
63 Id.  
64 Id.; see also Reynolds, supra note 59.  
65 Maly, supra note 29, at 901-02. 
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the United States, Australia’s legal roots are derived from the English 
common law.
66
 However, where the United States deviated from 
England’s defamation law, Australia continued to follow its example.
67
 
Thus, Australia holds reputation in higher regard than freedom of 
expression.
68
 
In addition, Australia does not have any similar standard akin to 
the New York Times requirement that public figures must demonstrate 
that the defendant acted with actual malice.
69
 Australian lawmakers 
support the lack of a different requirement for public figures by arguing 
that it would unjustly burden those in the public eye simply because of 
their status.
70
 Therefore, like England, the alleged defamatory statement 
is presumed false, and the burden is on the defendant to prove its truth, 
in which there is no burden of fault.
71
 
As an illustration, in Dow Jones v. Gutnick, Gutnick sued Dow 
Jones, publisher of the Wall Street Journal and Barron’s Magazine.
72
 An 
edition of Barron’s Online, found on the Wall Street Journal’s website 
included an article titled “Unholy Gains” that allegedly defamed 
Gutnick.
73
 In the suit, Dow Jones argued that Australia’s libel laws 
chilled U.S. notions of free speech and that the Australian court did not 
have jurisdiction over the matter.
74
 The High Court
75
 responded by 
affirming the judgment, reasoning that since the Internet allowed for 
Australian subscriptions to the website, and that “common law adapts 
even to radically different environments,”
76
 then Dow Jones could 
rightfully be bound by the libel laws of Australia. 
 
66 Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 281. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 281-82. 
71 Id. at 282. 
72 Dow Jones and Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (Austl.).  
73 Id. at 2.  
74 Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 282. 
75 The High Court of Australia is the final court of appeal in Australia. Operation 
of the High Court, HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/about/operation 
76 Dow Jones and Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56, 90 (Austl.). 
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B.  Contrasting U.S. and British Civil Procedure 
1.  Personal Jurisdiction 
As mentioned in the Introduction, a U.S. court cannot adjudicate a 
case without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
77
 
This obstacle serves as the primary barrier in deciding whether a U.S. 
court can adjudicate the enforceability of a foreign judgment.
78
 In order 
to acquire personal jurisdiction over the foreign party, the court must 
comply with the forum’s statutory requirements and the due process 
requirements of the Constitution.
79
 To satisfy these requirements, the 
court must apply either an applicable federal statute or a state long-arm 
statute.  A federal statute or the forum state’s long arm-statute indicates 
under what conditions a foreign party can be hauled into court in a 
particular forum.
80
 At the same time, the state’s basis for exercising 
personal jurisdiction must comply with the constitutional standard of 
minimum contacts.
81
 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts a 
court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign party. Due 
process requires that the defendant have “certain minimum contacts” 
with the forum state such that the suit “does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
82
 What constitutes 
minimum contacts has been an issue of debate for the Supreme Court 
over the years; however, the enduring rationale is to protect a defendant 
from the inconvenience of traveling to a foreign forum to defend against 
the suit, and to make certain that states do not overextend their 
sovereign powers.
83
 However, the issue of sovereignty may play a 
greater part in international jurisdictional questions. In those situations a 
court may employ comity principles to refrain from meddling with 
another country’s fair exercise of jurisdiction.
84
 
 
77 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
78 Moore, supra note 53, at 3222. 
79 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) and (C). 
80 Moore, supra note 53, at 3222. 
81 See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to 
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of 
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts.”). 
82 Id. (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
83 Moore, supra note 53, at 3223; see also World Wide Volkswagen Corp v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
84 See discussion of comity and reciprocity infra Part IV. 
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If a defendant cannot assert “continuous and systematic . . . 
contacts”
85
 with the forum state sufficient for personal jurisdiction, the 
defendant can also claim specific jurisdiction – jurisdiction based 
exclusively on the defendant’s contacts arising from the plaintiff’s 
claim.
86
 However, it is important to note that it is the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state that are relevant to the court’s inquiry 
concerning whether proper jurisdiction exists.
87
 The defendant’s act 
must “purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws[;]” this is also known as the purposeful availment doctrine.
88
 
Perhaps most troubling is how to reconcile the standard of 
minimum contacts and traditional geographic boundaries with the 
Internet, since the Internet has created a world unrestricted by 
traditional geographic limits. Specific jurisdiction has been applied to 
the Internet context, whereby the defendant’s Internet activity must 
expressly target the forum state.
89
 The mere act of placing material on 
the Internet is not sufficient to sustain a finding of personal jurisdiction; 
rather, the defendant must have the requisite intent to target the readers 
of the forum state.
90
 In Young v. New Haven Advocate, a recent case that 
reviewed the purposeful availment doctrine’s application to the Internet, 
the Fourth Circuit looked at the advertisements and contents of the 
newspaper’s website, as well as the content of the article in question, to 
determine whether a Connecticut newspaper intended to target a 
Virginia audience.
91
 The Court then concluded that since the 
advertisements and other content on the website, coupled with the local 
content of the specific article, were all aimed at a Connecticut audience, 
it was unreasonable for the newspaper to anticipate being hauled into 
court in Virginia, and therefore jurisdiction was not proper.
92
 
Another difficult issue applies to defamation. Defamation is a non-
physical tort, without specific geographical boundaries, in which the 
method of publication (such as investigating, writing, printing and 
 
85 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).  
86 Id. at 414 n.8. 
87 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  
88 Id. (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 
89 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d. 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002). 
90 Id. at 263. 
91 Id. at 263-64. 
92 Id.  
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disseminating) may occur in many different jurisdictions.
93
 
Consequently, the jurisdictional issues do not neatly comport with the 
standard for minimum contacts.
94
 An example of this problem is 
illustrated in Calder v. Jones.
95
 
In Calder, the National Enquirer, Inc., a Florida corporation with 
its principal place of business in Florida, published an allegedly 
defamatory article about Calder, a California resident.
96
 The National 
Enquirer publishes a national weekly newspaper, with a circulation of 
over 5 million, and approximately 600,000 of those copies were sold in 
California.
97
 The article in dispute alleged that Calder drank so heavily 
as to interfere with her professional responsibilities.
98
 In the suit, the 
National Enquirer argued that jurisdiction was not proper in California. 
Nonetheless the Court held that because “the brunt of the harm,” 
regarding both the emotional distress and injury to reputation claims, 
was suffered in California, jurisdiction was proper.
99
 In other words, 
jurisdiction was appropriate “based on the ‘effects’ of [the National 
Enquirer’s Florida conduct in California.”
100
 Despite the fact that the 
Court clearly expanded the purposeful availment doctrine, it is 
questionable whether the effects test applies outside the scope of 
intentional torts.
101
 
Like American courts, an English court will find jurisdiction 
proper if the defendant caused a tort to occur in the forum.
102
 However, 
where the United States courts require the allegedly defamatory 
statements to target the particular forum, the English courts do not. As a 
result, based on the multiple publication rule,
103
 the English courts have 
had no trouble finding jurisdiction even if the publication consisted of 
merely a few Internet hits or hard copies purchased online in England.
104
 
 
93 Maly, supra note 29, at 910. 
94 Id.  
95 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
96 Id. at 784-85.  
97 Id. at 785. 
98 Id. at 789 . 
99 Id.  
100 Id.  
101 Moore, supra note 53, at 3226. 
102 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 262. 
103 See discussion of the multiple publication rule that every online hit constitutes a 
separate actionable tort discussed infra Part II B 3. 
104 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 262. 
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Recently, the English courts have become more willing to assert 
jurisdiction based on the belief that, with the growth of the Internet, 
plaintiffs have a greater interest in defending their reputations.
105
 In King 
v. Lewis,
106
 the English Court of Appeals noted that it is “the publisher’s 
choice of a global medium” and thus “the Internet publisher’s very 
choice of a ubiquitous medium, at least suggests a robust approach to 
the question of forum: a global publisher should not be too fastidious as 
to the part of the globe where he is made a libel defendant.”
107
 In that 
case, the English court allowed Don King, a boxing promoter and 
Florida resident, to sue a New York resident in England based on a 
libelous statement made on a California website.
108
 The Court reasoned 
that since boxing was very popular in England, Don King had a 
reputation to protect there, and that the publisher’s choice to post the 
article on a global medium exposed himself to a global forum.
109
 
2.  Statute of Limitations 
While not demanding of much explanation, the comparison 
between the statute of limitations in the United States and England is 
important. In the United States the statute of limitations begins to run 
from the first publication of the statement, albeit the publication may 
remain on sale or posted on the Internet.
110
 In England, however, the 
statute of limitations runs until the publication is no longer available in 
print format or online.
111
 
3.  Single vs. Multiple Publication Rule 
Related to the statute of limitations issue is the disparity between 
the United States and England’s publication rule. The difference 
between the statute of limitations results from what the American and 
English courts consider a “publication.” Most U.S. states follow the 
“single publication rule,” which states that “[a]ny one edition of a book 
or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a 
 
105 Id.  
106 King v. Lewis, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1329, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1329.html.  
107 Id. at [31]. 
108 Id. at [2]-[4]. 
109 Id. at [13], [27]-[32]. 
110 Hearing, supra note 1, at 48 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
111 Id.  
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motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single 
publication,” and can give rise to only one action for defamation.
112
 
Accordingly, a plaintiff can only bring one action, even if the harm was 
suffered in numerous jurisdictions.
113
 The courts adopted this rule to 
protect publishers from facing lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions and 
from the “undue harassment” that may result because of mass 
publications.
114
 The single publication rule also applies to the Internet 
context. Thus, the statute of limitations on the article begins to run when 
it is first published on the website.
115
 
England adheres to the “multiple publication rule,” which states 
that every publication of the disputed material gives rise to an 
actionable tort, even if the statement appears in multiple jurisdictions 
throughout the world.
116
 This rule was announced in 1849 in The Duke of 
Brunswick v. Harmer,
117
 where the Court held that a purchase of a 
seventeen-year-old back issue of a newspaper constituted a new 
“publication” and therefore gave rise to an actionable tort, regardless of 
the original publication date.
118
 As a result of this archaic rule, a single 
Internet hit will constitute a publication for libel purposes.
119
 However, 
due to the absurdity of this result, the Ministry of Justice sought a 
review of the rule, and in March 2010 found that it was appropriate to 
introduce a single publication rule, while leaving discretion to extend 
the time period if necessary.
120
 The detailed provisions necessary to 
administer the operation of the single publication rule are currently 
under consideration.
121
 
 
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(3) (1977); see definition of 
publication, supra note 4. 
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4)(b). 
114 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 260. 
115 Robert D. Sack, Statutes of Limitation and the Single Publication Rule, P.L.I. 
SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 7.2.1 (2011); see, e.g., 
Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 465-66 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that a libel claim was barred by 
New York’s one-year statute of limitations where the disputed speech was initially posted 
on the Internet more than a year before plaintiff filed suit). 
116 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 260-61. 
117 The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, (1849) 117 Eng. Rep. 175 (Q.B.). 
118 Id. at 176-77. 
119 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 261. 
120 Defamation and the internet: the multiple publication rule, MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE (2010), http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/defamation-internet-consultation-
paper.htm. 
121 Id.  
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4.  Fee Shifting 
Fee shifting rules provide a considerable incentive for libel 
plaintiffs to bring suit in England. In the United States each party to the 
litigation pays their own attorney’s fees, unless the statute or contract 
grants specific authority to collect those fees.
122
 The prevailing party 
does not collect attorney’s fees unless authorized by law.
123
 
On the other hand, under fee shifting in England the losing party 
bears all of the costs related to the litigation.
124
 This is significant in the 
libel context because the defendant bears the burden of proof, and the 
likelihood of a plaintiff victory is substantial. Furthermore, the cost of 
litigation in England can run into the millions of dollars because most 
libel cases require multiple attorneys.
125
 
5. Forum Non Conveniens 
One possible solution for a media defendant facing a defamation 
suit in England is to argue that the suit should be dismissed on forum 
non conveniens grounds. This legal doctrine allows for dismissal where 
personal jurisdiction is proper, but the practicalities of facing litigation 
in the forum places an undue burden on the defendant and thus the case 
should be transferred to a more convenient court.
126
 However, in effect, 
this procedural device does little to restrain the reach of English courts, 
because it is dependent on the discretion of the judge, and British judges 
view their jurisdiction broadly.
127
 British courts justify jurisdiction based 
on the argument that the tort occurred there, even when the connection 
to England is tenuous.
128
 They have also indicated that because the 
action would most likely not “survive” in the United States, “there 
would seem little point in addressing how much more convenient [a 
U.S. forum] would be.”
129
 
 
122 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). 
123 Id.  
124 Hearing, supra note 1, at 49 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
125 Id.; see also Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 259. 
126 Hearing, supra note 1, at 21 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP); see generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
127 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 264. 
128 Id.; see also Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 832 (N.Y. 2007) (only 
23 copies sold in UK but still sustained jurisdiction because the tort occurred there). 
129 King, supra note 106, at 18. 
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III. PREVALENCE AND CHILLING EFFECTS OF LIBEL 
TOURISM ON FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTED SPEECH 
While the comparison of libel laws and jurisdictional issues 
between the United States and England depicts an undoubtedly sharp 
divergence in their approaches to defamation, and reveals why England 
is a significantly more attractive venue to bring a defamation suit, it is 
important to ascertain just how prevalent this “legal loophole” is and 
who its victims are. Is the intentional and strategic decision to forum 
shop and file suit outside the United States, in actuality, a problem to be 
remedied by federal legislation, or does Ehrenfeld stand out as an 
outlier, an atypical case with an extreme set of facts? 
A foreign defamation judgment may have wide-ranging 
implications. Arguably, the one most concerning and troubling for 
media defendants is its ability to chill their protected First Amendment 
free speech rights. Libel tourism’s chilling effect cuts off the free flow 
of information that should reach the public, and instead silences authors 
and journalists.
130
 Journalists are often compelled to self-censor their 
speech to ensure that their statements not only conform to the standards 
of the First Amendment, but also that they satisfy the more “stifling 
strictures of English libel law.”
131
 Although it is difficult to evaluate if 
and how libel tourism may chill free expression because it is impossible 
to catalogue what has been held from publication, testimony from 
prominent media lawyers indicates just how far reaching the chilling 
effect is, particularly on writings about controversial international 
subjects.
132
 
Media lawyers, such as Bruce D. Brown, partner at Baker & 
Hostetler, LLC, who review their clients’ material before it is published, 
have firsthand knowledge of how libel tourism has altered the “legal 
landscape.”
133
 For example, more than a decade ago, Mr. Brown’s 
colleagues represented journalist Craig Unger in a libel suit filed by 
Robert McFarlane against Esquire magazine.
134
 The alleged defamatory 
statement concerned an article entitled “October Sunrise,” which 
 
130 Hearing, supra note 1, at 23 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 24; see also McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 
1996).  
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discussed efforts to negotiate the release of the American hostages in 
Iran.
135
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found in Mr. 
Unger’s favor, indicating that there was no evidence to suggest the 
material in the article was false. However, approximately a decade later, 
Mr. Unger’s British publisher canceled their plans to bring to England 
his book, House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship 
Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties, a U.S. bestseller.
136
 
A potential suit by the members of the Saudi Royal Family prevented 
the publication of Mr. Unger’s book even though it was cleared for 
publication and published in the United States.
137
 
As a further illustration, Laura Handman, partner at Davis Wright 
Tremaine, LLP testified that the U.S. publishers her firm represents 
repeatedly receive letters on behalf of U.S. celebrities and 
businesspeople from both U.S. and British law firms threatening 
lawsuits in England if the allegedly defamatory statements are 
published.
138
 If the work has already been published, U.S. publishers are 
eager to settle the claims because of the high economic risk, and the 
knowledge that the claim will likely succeed in England.
139
 
Consequently, while media lawyers may feel reassured that their clients 
are well protected by the First Amendment in the United States they 
must also counsel their clients about the risks of their work being 
exposed in England and the high probability of eventual litigation. 
Furthermore, Dr. Ehrenfeld experienced first-hand the chilling 
effects that the English judgment against her had on her U.S. protected 
free speech rights. She testified that she had many “sleepless nights” 
worrying that Mahfouz would come to New York to enforce the English 
judgment against her.
140
 Although he never attempted to enforce the 
judgment in the United States, the potential that he would “left it 
hanging over [her] head like a sword of Damocles,” thereby 
exacerbating the chilling effect.
141
 In addition, Ehrenfeld testified that 
the English judgment affected her ability to publish, and to travel to 
 
135 Hearing, supra note 1, at 24 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, 
Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 56 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright 
Tremaine, LLP). 
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 12 (testimony of Rachel Ehrenfeld). 
141 Hearing, supra note 1, at 12. 
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England, lest she be arrested to enforce the judgment against her.
142
 
Those who once “courted” her now refuse to publish her.
143
 Ehrenfeld 
was not Mahfouz’s only victim; he has obtained settlements in nearly 
forty cases, and boasts about his conquests on his website, thereby 
silencing and intimidating any of his would-be critics.
144
 
IV. PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN DEFAMATION JUDGMENTS 
While states in the United States enforce the judgments of other 
states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, there is 
no such requirement for foreign money judgments, and there is no 
federal law that mandates recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in the United States. 
145
 In addition, the United States is not a 
party to any treaties or international agreements dealing with the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, although Congress 
does have the authority to enact legislation that would prohibit the 
enforcement of foreign judgments if those judgments were found to be 
inconsistent with the First Amendment.
146
 
Curiously, the enforcement and recognition of foreign country 
judgments has largely been left to the states.
147
 Many, but not all, states 
have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition 
Act;
148
 however the adoptions are not consistent. For example, some 
states have incorporated the requirement of reciprocity that a foreign 
judgment will be recognized and enforced in the United States so long 
as a U.S. judgment would be enforced in a foreign country under similar 
 
142 Id; see discussion of enforcement of judgments infra Part IV. 
143 Hearing, supra note 1, at 14 (written statement by Rachel Ehrenfeld). 
144 Id.; Bin Mahfouz posts on his website how often he brings defamation suits 
against various American authors. BIN MAHFOUZ, http://www.binmahfouz.info/ 
en_index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).  
145 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181-82 (1895).  
146 Hearing, supra note 1, at 52 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP) (indicating that the Hague Convention on Choice Agreements 
would require Convention signatories to recognize judgments rendered by a court in another 
signatory country, and would apply to defamation judgments, but the United States has not 
yet ratified the Convention).  
147 Id. at 62 (written statement by Linda J. Silberman, Professor, New York 
University School of Law). 
148 UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962); UNIF. 
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005). 
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circumstances.
149
 Other states do not have this requirement; the adoption 
of the Uniform Act is left to the discretion of the states, and as a result, 
a foreign judgment may be enforced in one state, but not in another.
150
 In 
sum, there is no uniform American law governing the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. 
At the same time, the United States may enforce a foreign 
judgment despite the fact there is no law mandating enforcement. The 
underlying rationale of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments 
against U.S. parties is the general principle that in order to be enforced 
in the United States, the judgment must have been achieved through a 
fair and impartial process.
151
 This principle has been developed by the 
notion of comity – “the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, 
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the 
rights of its own citizens.”
152
 In other words, the doctrine of comity is 
meant to foster friendly international relations.
153
 On the other hand, a 
foreign judgment may be refused recognition if the judgment or cause 
of action is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or the 
state where recognition is wanted.
154
 In particular, U.S. courts have 
refused to recognize foreign defamation judgments when the 
enforcement would encroach on traditional First Amendment rights, and 
is thus repugnant to public policy.
155
 
In Bachchan v. India Abroad, a Swedish daily newspaper reported 
that Swiss authorities had frozen the bank account of Indian national 
Ajitabh Bachchan.
156
 A small New York publication, India Abroad, 
transmitted the story to India and printed and distributed the story in 
 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 63. 
151 Moore, supra note 53, at 3217. 
152 Hilton, supra note 145, at 163-64.  
153 Id. at 165.  
154 See e.g. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(3) 
(1962) (“[A] foreign judgment need not be recognized if [the cause of action] [claim for 
relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state”); see 
also UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(3) (2005) (“[A] 
court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if the foreign-country 
judgment or the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the foreign-country judgment is 
based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United States.”). 
155 Hearing, supra note 1, at 64 (written statement by Linda J. Silberman, 
Professor, New York University School of Law). 
156 Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 661 (Sup. Ct. 
1992).  
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England and New York. Bachchan, a well-known public figure in India 
and around the world, sued both the Swedish newspaper and India 
Abroad for libel in England.
157
 Even though the primary distribution 
occurred overwhelmingly in the United States, and only 1,000 copies 
were distributed in England, a judgment was entered against India 
Abroad, where it was held strictly liable for £40,000 for “publishing a 
story based on another paper’s ‘unwitting’ error.”
158
 
Although Bachchan was victorious in England, he had less good 
fortune in the United States. After his win in England, Bachchan 
instituted a proceeding in New York to enforce the English judgment 
against India Abroad.
159
 The Court declined to enforce the judgment on 
public policy grounds, stating that the First Amendment “would be 
seriously jeopardized by entry of [a] foreign libel judgment[s] granted 
pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but considered 
antithetical to the protections afforded [to] the press by the U.S. 
Constitution.”
160
 
The Maryland high court reached the analogous conclusion that a 
foreign libel judgment contravened the First Amendment and precluded 
recognition of the judgment. In Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, Telnikoff, an 
English citizen, complained in an op-ed column published in London’s 
Daily Telegraph, that the BBC’s Russian Service employed too many 
“Russian-speaking national minorities” but not enough of “‘those who 
associate themselves ethnically, spiritually or religiously with the 
Russian people.’”
161
 Matusevitch, a Maryland resident, responded with 
an angry letter also published in the Telegraph.
162
 The letter protested 
what he considered Telnikoff as advocating for a “switch from 
professional testing to a blood test” and was “stressing his racialist 
recipe by claiming that no matter how high the standards and integrity 
‘of ethnically alien’ people Russian staff might be, they should be 
dismissed.”
163
 In the United States, the letter would have been 
considered the “heated hyperbole uttered in the course of public debate 
that is protected by the First Amendment in this country as non-
 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 662; Hearing, supra note 1, at 52-53 (written statement by Laura 
Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
159 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662. 
160 Id. at 664. 
161 Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 233 (Md. 1997). 
162 Id. at 565-66. 
163 Id. at 566. 
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actionable opinion.”
164
 However, the English jury concluded otherwise, 
and found that the letter expressed the “fact” that Telnikoff was a 
racialist, and awarded Telnikoff £240,000.
165
 
Telnikoff then sought to enforce the judgment in the United States. 
“The United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered 
judgment for Matusevitch,” concluding that the “English libel judgment 
was ‘repugnant to the public policy of the state’ of Maryland and the 
United States.
166
 After Telnikoff appealed the district court’s decision, 
the D.C. Circuit certified the question whether Telnikoff’s foreign 
judgment was repugnant to the public policy of Maryland to Maryland’s 
highest court.
167
 The Maryland Court of Appeals answered in the 
affirmative, stating: 
[A]t the heart of the First Amendment . . . is the recognition of the 
fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on 
matters of public interest and concern. The importance of that free 
flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public concern precludes 
Maryland recognition of Telnikoff’s English libel judgment.
168
 
Aside from the public policy defense, a party may also sue for 
declaratory relief, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act,
169
 that a 
foreign judgment is unenforceable in a U.S. court. The court will 
“declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party” and 
the judgment for her “shall have the force and effect of a final judgment 
or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”
170
 However, this provision 
does not provide for any further jurisdictional powers upon U.S. courts, 
thus personal jurisdiction remains a complex threshold matter. 
 
 
164 Hearing, supra note 1, at 53-54 (2009) (written statement by Laura Handman, 
Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
165 Telnikoff, 347 Md. at 571. 
166 Id. at 572. 
167 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the cause 
of action underlying the English libel judgment was “repugnant to the public policy of the 
State within the meaning of Maryland’s Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition 
Act” and that “recognition of the foreign judgment under principles of comity would be 
repugnant to the public policies of the State of Maryland and the United States.” 
Alternatively, the District Court held that recognition and enforcement would violate the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Telnikoff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit, which certified the question of whether the English judgment was 
repugnant to the public policy of the state of Maryland. Id. at 572-73. 
168 Id. at 602. 
169 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006). 
170 Id. 
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In Bachchan and Telnikoff, the states of New York and Maryland 
concluded that recognition of foreign libel judgments in the United 
States impaired the public policy of New York and Maryland, as well as 
of the United States.  However, a more recent effort to declare a foreign 
libel judgment unenforceable in the United States proved unsuccessful. 
The New York Court of Appeals in Ehrenfeld, while acknowledging the 
problem of libel tourism, determined that Mahfouz’s contact with New 
York could not establish a proper basis for jurisdiction, and therefore 
Ehrenfeld’s argument to expand New York’s long-arm statute must be 
directed to the legislature.
171
 
V. RESPONSES TO LIBEL TOURISM 
It was evident from the Ehrenfeld decision that to combat the 
problems of libel tourism effectively, a legislative response was crucial. 
The decision prompted a national public outcry and united free speech 
advocates to fight on Ehrenfeld’s behalf.
172
 New York responded with 
the Libel Terrorism Protection Act
173
 and other states were quick to 
follow with similar versions of their own.
174
 In August 2010, the 
SPEECH Act, a federal answer to libel tourism, was signed into law by 
President Barack Obama.
175
 
A. States’ Responses 
Motivated by the Ehrenfeld decision, the New York legislature 
responded by enacting the Libel Terrorism Protection Act (often dubbed 
“Rachel’s Law”) and amending their jurisdictional statute.
176
 First, the 
Act amended New York’s version of their Uniform Act and provided 
that a defamation judgment rendered outside the United States will not 
 
171 Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834-37 (N.Y. 2007); see discussion 
of state’s responses infra Part V; see also discussion of personal jurisdiction supra Part II B 
1.  
172 Adam Cohen, ‘Libel Tourism’: When Freedom of Speech Takes a Holiday, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/opinion/ 
15mon4.html.    
173 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009). 
174 For example, Illinois passed a similar version of the New York Act. See ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/12-621(b)(7) (2009). 
175 See Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional 
Heritage Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-
05) (2010)). 
176 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 
2009). 
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be enforced in New York courts unless the court in New York 
concludes that the defamation law applied by the foreign court provides 
“at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press . . . as 
would be provided by both the United States and New York 
constitutions.”
177
 Since virtually “no other jurisdiction provides as high a 
level of protection for speech as the United States,” the Act disables 
almost every foreign defamation judgment.
178
 
Second, the Act amended New York’s long-arm statute by 
attaching jurisdiction to foreign defendants, so long as the allegedly 
defamatory publication was published in New York, the domestic 
plaintiff is a resident of New York and is amenable to jurisdiction in 
New York, or may have to take action in New York to comply with the 
judgment.
179
 This extension of jurisdiction in effect provides that no 
territorial nexus between the foreign defendant and the domestic 
plaintiff is required. As a result, a domestic plaintiff can bring an action 
for declaratory relief with much greater ease and can seek to preempt an 
enforcement suit. 
Soon after, Illinois followed suit. Taking the New York bill as a 
model, Illinois amended its version of the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act. The Illinois law extended long-arm 
jurisdiction over libel tourists, and provided grounds for non-
enforcement of foreign defamation judgments.
180
 
B. Federal Response 
Upon the urging of media lawyers, legislators, legal commentators, 
and other lobbying groups, the Securing the Protection of our Enduring 
and Established Constitutional Heritage Act or “SPEECH Act” was 
enacted and signed into law by President Obama on August 10, 2010.
181
 
The purpose is to prohibit recognition and enforcement of foreign 
defamation judgments against United States’ authors and publishers, as 
well as certain foreign judgments against the providers of interactive 
computer services, in other words, to prevent libel tourism. The 
SPEECH Act operates as both “a shield and a sword to protect [United 
 
177 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009). 
178 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 276. 
179 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2009). 
180 735 ILL. COMP. STAT, 5/12-621(b)(7) (2009); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT, 5/2-
209(b)(5) (2009). 
181 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05. 
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States’ citizens] from foreign defamation judgments.”
182
 The “shield” 
feature in the law permits an American defendant to remain passive, 
given that a foreign defamation judgment cannot be enforced in the 
United States unless the judgment holder meets the requirements of the 
SPEECH Act.  It also acts as a “sword,” because it creates a cause of 
action for declaratory relief in federal court to challenge the 
enforceability of the foreign defamation judgment. 
The “shield” aspect of the SPEECH Act sets forth a three-pronged 
approach. In an action to enforce the foreign judgment, the person 
seeking to enforce the judgment must first prove that the foreign court’s 
application of their defamation law provided at least as much protection 
as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the 
constitution and law of the state where the domestic court resides; or 
that the American defendant would have been liable anyway under the 
state’s libel law.
183
 Second, where applicable, the defendant must prove 
that the foreign defamation judgment is consistent with Section 230 of 
the Communications Act of 1934.
184
 Finally, the foreign defendant must 
prove that the foreign court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the 
media defendant comported with the U.S. Constitution’s due process 
requirements.
185
 If a foreign defendant cannot meet these requirements, 
the state or federal court cannot recognize or enforce the foreign 
defamation judgment.
186
 
The SPEECH Act applies to both state and federal courts; 
however, a defendant has the discretion to remove the case to federal 
court with no amount in controversy requirement.
187
 The law also 
provides an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the party opposing 
recognition or enforcement of the foreign defamation judgment.
188
 This 
provision is one-sided, and only provides attorneys’ fees to the party 
 
182 Jennifer A. Mansfield, New Federal Law Protects Authors, Interactive 
Computer Services from Foreign Defamation Judgments, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Sept. 22, 
2010),  available at http://www.hklaw.com/ 
id24660/PublicationId2984/ReturnId31/contentid55120/. 
183 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
184 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (c); Section 230 provides immunity from liability for 
providers and users of an interactive computer service who publish information by third 
parties. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). 
185 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (b). 
186 Id. 
187 28 U.S.C. § 4103. 
188 28 U.S.C. § 4105. 
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opposing enforcement.
189
 
The SPEECH Act can also act as a “sword.”
190
 It provides that any 
U.S. person may bring an action in federal court for a declaratory 
judgment that the foreign defamation judgment is repugnant to the U.S. 
Constitution (the First Amendment) or the laws of the United States.
191
 
Additionally, this provision can also serve as a “double-edged sword,”
192
 
in which the law provides for nationwide service of process, thus 
making it easier to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign 
defendant.
193
 On the other side, though, is the requirement that the 
domestic plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the foreign 
defamation law is repugnant.
194
 In addition, it appears that the attorneys’ 
fees provision only applies in an action “to enforce a foreign judgment 
for defamation,” not for declaratory judgments.
195
 Under the Act, 
declaratory judgment actions seek to declare the foreign defamation 
judgment invalid, not to enforce it; therefore, it seems to only apply 
when the media defendant “acts solely in a defensive manner.”
196
 
VI. IMPACT OF THE SPEECH ACT 
The SPEECH Act is a national response to libel tourism. The 
issues and illustrations described earlier indicate that libel tourism is a 
global problem in need of a national remedy. However, in order to 
continue to foster friendly international relations and remain respectful 
of other countries’ sovereignty, federal legislation needs to carefully 
balance the interest of protecting American citizens’ First Amendment 
free speech rights on the one hand, while also being mindful to not 
overly intrude upon another country’s jurisdiction. The SPEECH Act 
provides this remedy. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the SPEECH 
Act will have the intended effect, because the balance provides gaps 
whereby a U.S. person facing litigation abroad may not have the 
SPEECH Act as protection.  Moreover, the problem of libel tourism is 
international in scope; thus, the most effective solution must be 
 
189 Id. 
190 Mansfield, supra note 180. 
191 28 U.S.C. § 4104(a)(1). 
192 Mansfield, supra note 180. 
193 28 U.S.C. § 4104(b). 
194 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(2). 
195 28 U.S.C. § 4105. 
196 Mansfield, supra note 180. 
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international as well.
197
 Despite this, the SPEECH Act provides a 
national solution to libel tourism, and reaches as far as permitted by the 
U.S. Constitution. 
A. Libel Perspective 
One troubling feature of the SPEECH Act is that it does not define 
who specifically is a libel tourist.
198
 However, in Congress’ findings it is 
clear that the SPEECH Act expressly refers to the problem of persons 
“obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors and 
publishers.”
199
 In addition, the cause of action for declaratory relief 
directly references “Any United States person against whom a foreign 
judgment is entered.”
200
 Thus, it is evident that the SPEECH Act is 
limited to those libel plaintiffs who initiate litigation abroad against 
United States persons for the purpose of capitalizing on the foreign 
country’s plaintiff friendly libel laws. As an illustration, the SPEECH 
Act would not apply to an Englishman who has assets in the United 
States, and is sued by another Englishman in England.
201
 Because the 
SPEECH Act directly references United States persons, the Englishman 
faced with a lawsuit in England is not a United States person as defined 
by the SPEECH Act.
202
 
 
197 Justin S. Hemlepp, Recent Development: “Rachel’s Law” Wraps New York’s 
Long-Arm Around Libel Tourists; Will Congress Follow Suit?, 17 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL’Y 387, 391 (2008). 
198 The SPEECH Act only references in its findings that “[s]ome persons are 
obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors and publishers . . . by seeking 
out foreign jurisdictions that do not provide the full extent of free-speech protections to 
authors and publishers that are available in the United States, and suing a United States 
author or publisher in that foreign jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05. 
199 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05 (emphasis added). 
200 28 U.S.C. § 4104(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
201 Hearing, supra note 1, at 90 (Letter from John J. Walsh, Carter Ledyard & 
Milburn, LLP) (discussing his concern that the proposed bill, H.R. 6164 would also bar 
enforcement of an Englishman’s English libel judgment against a fellow Englishman who 
has assets in the United States needed to satisfy the judgment). 
202 “The term ‘United States person’ means— 
(A) a United States citizen; 
(B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
(C) an alien lawfully residing in the United States at the time that the speech that is the 
subject of the foreign defamation action was researched, prepared, or disseminated; or 
(D) a business entity incorporated in, or with its primary location or place of operation in, 
the United States.” 
28 U.S.C. § 4101(6). 
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Another problem arises. What if the defamation suit is based on a 
meritorious claim that an American person or publication sincerely 
defamed the libel plaintiff? For example, what if an American is sued in 
England for passing out leaflets in Piccadilly Circus that allegedly 
defamed an English person? Can this United States person come to the 
United States and seek declaratory relief that the foreign judgment is 
unenforceable? The answer must be no. Based on the spirit and 
language of the SPEECH Act, it is evident that Congress was referring 
to those libel plaintiffs who purposely seek out foreign countries for 
their libel laws and when the allegedly defamatory statements have little 
or no connection to the forum where litigation is initiated.
203
 The 
jurisdictional and declaratory relief provisions of the SPEECH Act 
provide a means to distinguish between colorable claims that are of 
legitimate interest to foreign courts and those that are merely abusive. 
Most significantly, the SPEECH Act will serve as a solution to the 
chilling effect that libel tourism has had on so many American 
publishers and journalists. If an American finds him or herself in the 
position of defending a defamation suit abroad, he or she can default on 
the suit and seek declaratory relief in the United States.
204
 Since the 
United States’ libel laws favor freedom of expression rather than 
damage to reputation, it is likely that a U.S. court will find that the 
foreign court’s application of their defamation law does not comport 
with the First Amendment, especially if the defamation suit is initiated 
in England.
205
 
In addition, the SPEECH Act may have a deterrent effect on libel 
tourists. If the libel plaintiff is interested in seeking a money judgment 
from a media defendant who does not have assets in the foreign forum, 
the libel tourist may reconsider the prospects of filing a defamation suit. 
If the suit is filed in England, it is highly likely the libel plaintiff will be 
victorious, but if the judgment cannot be enforced in the United States, 
then the foreign judgment will effectively be rendered meaningless. 
Without assets in the country from which the libel plaintiff can collect, 
 
203 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05 (Congress’ findings state that “Some persons are 
obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors and publishers, and in turn 
chilling the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States interest of the citizenry 
in receiving information on matters of importance, by seeking out foreign jurisdictions that 
do not provide the full extent of free-speech protections.”) (emphasis added). 
204 28 U.S.C. § 4104.  
205 See discussion of differences between the United States and England’s libel 
laws, supra Part I and II. 
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the defamation suit is of little value.
206
 Furthermore, if the libel tourist 
chooses to enforce the foreign judgment before the media defendant 
seeks a declaratory judgment, and the libel tourist loses, he will be 
subject to reasonable attorneys’ fees.
207
 Accordingly, the libel tourist has 
much to lose with the enactment of the SPEECH Act, and it can 
therefore be a very costly endeavor to protect one’s reputation. 
On the other hand, for wealthy executives like Bin Mahfouz who 
often bring these suits,
208
 seeking enforcement of the judgment is of no 
great importance. Rather, these libel tourists initiate litigation to silence 
American authors and journalists. The defamation suit acts as an 
intimidation tool to threaten Americans from publishing writings on 
subjects of international concern, specifically on matters of terrorism.
209
 
As a result, the SPEECH Act may provide little deterrent effect for 
these particular libel tourists. However, as discussed above, by seeking 
a declaratory judgment, the chilling effects are greatly diminished 
because American authors and journalists will feel less threatened and 
intimidated by foreign litigation and therefore continue to report on 
matters of international concern. 
B. Civil Procedure Perspective 
The SPEECH Act grants a national service of process provision for 
actions seeking declaratory relief in federal court. This provision will 
make it easier to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.  
In other words, personal jurisdiction will be proper so long as the due 
process minimum contacts requirement is satisfied or specific 
jurisdiction is obtained.
210
 The nationwide service of process provision 
will allow a court to sustain jurisdiction, provided that the foreign 
defendant has some connection to the United States; the contacts do not 
have to be found in a particular forum, but rather the United States as a 
 
206 On the other hand, for example, Rachel Ehrenfeld cannot travel to the UK 
without running the risk of being arrested to enforce Mahfouz’s judgment against her. 
Hearing, supra note 1, at 14 (prepared statement of Rachel Ehrenfeld). 
207 28 U.S.C. § 4105. 
208 Bin Mahfouz posts on his website how often he brings defamation suits against 
various American authors. See Bin Mahfouz Information, BIN MAHFOUZ, 
http://www.binmahfouz.info/faqs_4.html. 
209 Hearing, supra note 1, at 8 (prepared statement of the Honorable Peter King, 
Representative in Congress from the State of New York). 
210 See supra Part II B 1 (discussion of personal jurisdiction).  
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whole.
211
 Courts have repeatedly held that when a federal statute 
contains a national service of process provision the provision will 
bestow personal jurisdiction in any federal district court on any 
defendant with minimum contacts to the United States.
212
 This provision 
ensures that a libel tourist, who may do occasional business throughout 
the United States, but not enough to satisfy a minimum contacts test in a 
particular jurisdiction, will still be amenable to suit in a federal court. 
However, the SPEECH Act does not assure that personal 
jurisdiction will be found in all cases. The constitutional requirements 
must still be satisfied. If the foreign defendant has no contacts sufficient 
to obtain jurisdiction, the U.S. court will have to dismiss the case for 
lack of personal jurisdiction, and thus the declaratory judgment cause of 
action will be of little assistance to the domestic plaintiff. Such an 
outcome would be unfortunate, but it comports with due process. 
New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act extended New York’s 
long-arm statute to sustain personal jurisdiction over any person who 
obtains a foreign defamation judgment against a resident of New York 
or a person amenable to jurisdiction there, regardless of the foreign 
defendant’s ties to the state.
213
 Although the law has not been 
challenged, many critics argue that the jurisdictional provision violates 
“long-standing principles of due process.”
214
 The Advisory Committee 
on Civil Practice has questioned the constitutionality of the provision, 
and predicted that it would face court challenges.
215
 So while the New 
York law makes obtaining jurisdiction dramatically easier, it is most 
likely unconstitutional. As a result, the SPEECH Act’s jurisdiction 
provision is the greatest constitutional measure that can be taken, short 
of an international solution. 
 
 
211 28 U.S.C. § 4104(b). 
212 See, e.g., Medical Mutual of Ohio v. DeSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that Congress has the power to confer nationwide personal jurisdiction); Mariash v. 
Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 allows for a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction). 
213 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (CONSOL. 2012). 
214 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 279. 
215 Joel Stashenko, Civil Practice Committee Finds Fault with Libel Tourism Bill, 
N.Y.L.J. March 4, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp? 
id=1204544930713&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.  
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C. Comity and Reciprocity 
While there are more direct ways to prevent a U.S. author or 
publisher from defending a suit in a foreign court, for example, through 
injunctive relief, this would cause great intrusion into the affairs of the 
foreign tribunal. The SPEECH Act does not go this far. It does not 
enjoin the foreign court proceedings, but does allow for lack of 
jurisdiction as an additional ground for non-enforcement and a cause of 
action for declaratory relief. In this way the SPEECH Act both respects 
the sovereignty of other countries, while also protecting Americans’ 
First Amendment rights.
216
 The doctrine of comity allows a U.S. court to 
enforce a foreign judgment, so long as it was rendered by a fair and 
impartial process.
217
 Similarly, a U.S. court can refuse enforcement of a 
foreign judgment if the laws of the foreign court do not comport with 
the laws and Constitution of the United States on grounds of public 
policy. These principles are not affected by the SPEECH Act. The law 
does not automatically render a foreign defamation judgment 
unenforceable. Rather, the party seeking enforcement, or the party 
seeking declaratory relief, must prove that the foreign court’s 
defamation law offends the principles of the First Amendment.
218
 
A declaration by a U.S. court that a foreign judgment is repugnant 
to the First Amendment will give United States publishers a mechanism 
and the comfort necessary to continue to publish their material, 
regardless of a contrary verdict in England. For example, Bin Mahfouz 
would not have been able to deter Rachel Ehrenfeld from publishing 
similar allegations or material. Ehrenfeld does not have to wait for 
Mahfouz to come to the United States to enforce his judgment against 
her, but rather empowers Ehrenfeld to respond proactively. 
D.  Is the SPEECH Act Necessary? 
The problems posed by libel tourism make clear that the Ehrenfeld 
decision is not just an atypical case, and does not stand as an outlier. 
Instead, libel tourism is a major threat to American authors and 
publishers and to the First Amendment in general. As the many 
illustrations and cases indicate, the readiness of British libel law judges 
to generously extend the jurisdiction of their courts allows foreign 
 
216 See supra note 200 (SPEECH Act’s definition of a United States person). 
217 See supra Part IV (discussion of comity). 
218 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05.  
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claimants to bring suit even when the allegedly defamatory statement 
has a tenuous connection to the United Kingdom.
219
 Although libel 
tourism does threaten the First Amendment, the need for a federal 
response is debatable. The tide seems to be turning in England, as recent 
commentary suggests that England’s archaic libel jurisprudence may be 
changing.
220
 In addition, other remedies for libel tourism exist. Such 
remedies include a public policy argument and a proposed federal 
statute that would create a uniform national rule for enforcement of 
foreign country judgments not limited to the concern of libel tourism. 
1. England’s Reaction to Libel Tourism 
Even though libel tourism is a problem of international concern, it 
could arguably be stated that with the existing law and various doctrines 
already in place, the SPEECH Act is unnecessary legislation. To begin 
with, there is reason to believe that England, the libel capital, is in the 
process of amending their defamation laws.  An article from 
Economist.com hinted that concerns are being expressed in Britain 
regarding their defamation law.
221
 Denis MacShane, a senior Labour 
MP, stated in a debate in the House of Commons, that libel tourism is 
“an international scandal” and “a major assault on freedom of 
information.”
222
 In addition, the article stated that a parliamentary 
committee dealing with the media has “received a large number of 
submissions from people worried about libel tourism.”
223
 
Furthermore, as discussed previously, British defamation case law 
provides for exceptions to the traditional plaintiff-friendly standards. In 
particular, in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal, the British court recognized 
a defense to libel since the allegedly defamatory article dealt with a 
matter of genuine public interest.
224
 In addition, the disputed statement 
made a proper contribution to the whole force of the publication, the 
publisher acted reasonably and fairly in obtaining the material, and the 
 
219 See Hearing, supra note 1, at 153 (response to post-hearing questions from 
Laura R. Handman, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP) (citing recent examples of Britain’s 
generous jurisdictional reach).  
220 See infra Part VI D 1 (discussion of England’s reaction to libel tourism). 
221 Are English Courts Stifling Free Speech Around the World?, 
ECONOMIST.COM, Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/12903058.  
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Jameel v. Wall St. Journal S.P.R.L. [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C. 359 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (H.L.). 
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disputed article was of important public interest.
225
 The defense in 
Jameel is also known as the “responsible journalism” exception, which 
allows a defendant to publish the disputed material if the statements are 
researched and presented professionally and the subject matter is in the 
public interest.
226
 
As a result, if Britain changes its defamation law, the SPEECH Act 
will be deemed unnecessary for a majority of libel tourism suits. 
However, English defamation law is deeply rooted, and thus highly 
unlikely to reach the high level of protection one finds in the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in the near future. On the 
other hand, with the passage of the SPEECH Act, the British legislature 
and courts may become more compelled to amend their defamation 
laws in the direction of First Amendment protection of the press. In 
other words, if American publishers and journalists choose not to 
publish in England out of fear of a defamation suit, there will be more 
incentive to amend British defamation law.
227
 
2. Redundancy 
A related issue to the comity and reciprocity concerns is one of 
redundancy. U.S. courts have already refused to enforce foreign 
defamation judgments. As discussed previously, in Bachchan and 
Telnikoff, the courts, on grounds of public policy, refused to enforce the 
British libel judgments, concluding that the foreign judgments were 
repugnant to the First Amendment. With these cases as precedent, other 
U.S. courts may decide that they have the authority to refuse 
enforcement, without the protection of the SPEECH Act. 
In addition, there is a proposed federal statute creating a uniform 
national rule for enforcement of foreign country judgments that has 
 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DRAFT DEFAMATION BILL 
CONSULTATION PAPER CP3/11 (March 2011), http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/ 
consultations/draft-defamation-bill-consultation.pdf, (proposing a new Defamation Bill that 
will issue in the next few months that seeks to reduce the chilling effect on freedom of 
expression that exists due to the present law); see generally What Does Lord Lester’s 
Defamation Bill Propose?, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, May 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/may/27/lord-lester-defamation-bill-analysis; Criticized 
Libel Laws to Change, PRESSTV, Jan. 11, 2011 available at 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/159744.html.  
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been adopted by the American Law Institute (ALI).
228
 The recommended 
legislation authorizes negotiation of agreements with foreign countries, 
regarding reciprocal enforcement of each other’s judgments.
229
 The 
legislation also offers incentives to foreign countries and their courts to 
enforce the judgments from the United States.
230
 
On the other hand, the SPEECH Act provides a visible, targeted 
response to the chilling effects of libel tourism. While U.S. courts have 
refused enforcement of foreign defamation judgments, there is no 
federal law mandating the recognition or refusal. The Uniform Foreign 
Money Judgments Recognition Act has been adopted at the state level, 
but not all states have adopted it, and those who have, have adopted 
inconsistent versions.
231
 Therefore, one state may refuse enforcement as 
repugnant to the public policy of the state; another state may recognize 
the foreign judgment. In order for an American author or journalist to be 
fully protected and certain that they will be protected by the laws of the 
United States, the federal response was necessary. With the enactment 
of the SPEECH Act, there is little doubt that all American authors and 
publishers are bound by the principles set forth in the First Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The SPEECH Act provides a national response to the practice of 
libel tourism. Although the Act will not deter all foreign defamation 
litigation abroad, it is a step in the right direction. The gaps that are 
found in the legislation are constitutionally inevitable. Short of an 
international solution, the SPEECH Act reaches as far as 
constitutionally permissible. In addition, the SPEECH Act reminds 
United States citizens of America’s commitment that “debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”
232
 The SPEECH 
Act stands as a forceful barrier for those who wish to circumvent the 
First Amendment and undo the free speech protections that hold an 
acclaimed place in American society. 
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